The Arctic is Cold Again: Climate Change, Political Competition and Security Challenges

Bringing together individuals from the Arctic community is one of the hallmarks of Arctic Circle. Public discussions and debates about the Arctic have clear, lasting benefits. The Berlin Forum was no exception. Our discussion at the Arctic Circle Berlin Forum titled The Arctic is Cold Again: Climate Change, Political Competition and Security Challenges covered two levels of Arctic geopolitics – the strategic and the technical. It was organized by the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network (NAADSN) and NATO’s Science and Technology Organization Centre for Maritime Research and Experimentation (STO CMRE). The panel brought together experts from the United States, Norway and Italy to discuss Arctic security. This article will summarize the discussions that took place.

Gathering experts on both the strategic and technical levels of Arctic security brought not only nuance to the conversation but also added depth to our discussions on the real changes in how militaries operating in the Arctic are being impacted by climate change. Maintaining strategic stability in the Arctic goes beyond understanding the various sub-regional security environments between North America and Europe but also requires investigating the drivers behind NATO’s increasing role in the region as well as challenges and opportunities such a turn presents and the technical know-how.

The changing global order impact: North American vs European Arctic.

The global order is changing, as is evident in shifting demographics as well as the broader decoupling of Sino-Russian-Western interests internationally. Such changes are also taking place in the Arctic. This has never truly been exceptional. Historically and in today’s world, the Arctic has been closely integrated into the international order. Cold War bipolarity was reflected in the Arctic through arms control. The post-Cold War unipolar moment was also present in the Arctic when considering the US-led circumpolar liberal Arctic rules-based order. Today’s Arctic is characterized by a triangle of relations between China, the United States and Russia. While China is returning to its historic great power status in the world, so too is Russia returning to its identity as a great Eurasian power, and the United States is facing challenges to its unipolarity. In the Arctic, this is reflected in the increasing division between a US-led NATO-Western Arctic and a Russian Arctic that is increasingly turning to China and the BRICS countries for its multi-polar vision of Arctic governance.

There are two takeaways from these shifts in the strategic environment. First, the post-Cold War Arctic order relied on a world order that was characterized by American dominance, Russian retrenchment and relative Chinese disinterest in the region. Given that all three of these factors are no longer true, we should not expect a return to this Arctic order of the past. Second, given the increasing competition, it is imperative to pay attention to strategic stability in the Arctic, particularly the role of nuclear deterrence. For those concerned with Arctic security, maintaining strategic stability is paramount, making it essential to prioritize this focus in the years ahead.

What are key differences in the security environment between the European and the North American Arctic?

While there are shared security realities across the Atlantic, such as increasing accessibility of the Arctic due to the melting of sea ice and multiplying hybrid threats, the European and North American Arctic face different threat environments. For the European Arctic, Russia is a proximate threat due to its strategic interests in protecting its secondary strike capability on the Kola Peninsula. Thus, European Arctic actors must balance and understand the necessity of having long-standing security interactions with Russia, such as those concerning search and rescue. That being said, there are significant changes to the European Arctic such as Finland and Sweden joining NATO and the broader reinvigoration of Nordic defense. The European Union is an especially important actor here and is engaging more primarily through a soft power approach that relies on tackling climate change, diversifying its energy supply from Russia to Norway, scientific cooperation and the blue economy and focusing on the economic benefits of the Arctic. However, it is constrained by its limited capacity to influence Arctic dynamics, the bureaucratic nature of the EU itself and the role of national interests.

In the North American Arctic, Russia is recognized as an issue, but China is seen as the primary threat on a global level that is then extrapolated to the Arctic. The North American Arctic also faces significant human security challenges due to the nature of isolated communities in the Canadian Arctic. Despite those differences, there are real reasons to examine how a transatlantic perspective on Arctic security—emphasizing a newly expanded NATO—presents real opportunities.

What opportunities and challenges does NATO face if it is to take a more Arctic-centric approach?

There is no question that NATO has a role to play in the Arctic and it is increasing its engagement through its mandate to defend the West from Russia’s assertive posture, maintain its role in nuclear deterrence, and counteract China. NATO could take advantage of Finnish and Swedish expertise in operating in cold weather environments and experience in dealing with long-standing Russian hybrid threats. Closer integration with Sweden and Finland also could lead to better domain awareness and information sharing across the Atlantic. The recent expansion also provides an opportunity to rethink and conceptualize shared strategic messaging as deterrence against Russia and China, particularly on gray zone threats to critical maritime infrastructure. These opportunities come with the caveat that Russia perceives Finland and Sweden’s joining of NATO as a vindication of their strategic posture and NATO’s encirclement hypothesis. NATO has also thus far taken a careful approach to Russia and engaging more seriously in the Arctic might threaten that position. Lastly, the national interests of NATO members may constrain NATO from taking an Alliance-wide approach.

While these strategic questions and considerations play a role for states engaging in the Arctic both through and apart from NATO, so too do operational-level concerns matter. Without linking strategic questions and technical know-how, the actualities of how NATO and other nations can operate in the Arctic will remain misunderstood. Climate change is one such concern for security operations.

How might climate change impact security operations, particularly for NATO?

Climate change is a defining security challenge to Allied security, and operating in extreme conditions, particularly in the Arctic, is of central concern. Panelists from NATO’s STO CMRE Climate Change and Security Program outlined existing and future projects related to the Arctic.

The key technical security challenge is submarines and their ability to operate in the Arctic. Anti-Submarine Operations (ASW) are an important aspect of this work. To detect a submarine, operators rely on sonar systems, which are affected by many different variables, which are in turn impacted by climate change. Two examples of this are ocean temperature and the salinity of ocean waters. One study from NATO’s STO CMRE Climate Change and Security Program explored this very question, using simulations from deep water locations in the High North, two locations north and south of the GIUK Gap and one location in the Mediterranean. The research found that there was a 50% decrease in sonar detection in the High North, and changes to the underwater soundscape from shifts in salinity and temperature negatively impact sonar performance. This suggests that sonar transmitters and receiver depth configurations will need to be optimized to make sure that communication is not impacted. Other research similarly investigated how cracked sea ice leads to shifts in sonar transmissions. Specifically, a project on the Greenland Sea and Fram Strait—an important arena for ASW—found that validated ocean modeling capability designed for this particular region is essential, given the changes in how sound traveled in the strait.

Sonar is essential not only for ASW operations but also for safe navigation throughout the Arctic. Panelists presented research findings, which showed that the increasing roughness underneath sea ice obstructs sonar. Such difficulty might be solved through the development of portable acoustic tools that would map out the maritime environment in real-time, supporting the operation of naval operations and exercises in the Arctic. Additional research explored how wave patterns are changing in the Arctic, making search and rescue operations more difficult.

Where do we go from here?

The Arctic is increasingly seen as a new theatre, whether for geopolitical competition, economic engagement, or simply more interaction between actors. Adding nuance to these interactions is important. The broader decoupling of Sino-Russian-Western interests has implications for the Arctic, namely that the region will not return to its era of exceptional cooperation and peace. However, dynamics will be different in the North American and European Arctic. NATO’s emerging role in the Arctic will be an essential area to watch in the years to come as it draws upon existing expertise in the region and may serve to draw the seven western Arctic states closer together. Yet it and all states in the region will have to be cognizant of the technical challenges that face continued Arctic engagement. The changing sonar detection capabilities in the High North have serious implications for submarine operations in the context of geopolitical competition but also for safe navigation writ large, which impacts all Arctic adjacent nations. The future of Arctic security demands a serious evaluation of this new geopolitically tense environment and how climate change impacts the Arctic in unexpected ways that have strategic consequences.

Our panelists included Gabriella Gricius, a PhD Candidate from Colorado State University and Media Coordinator & Research Fellow at NAADSN, Dr. Rasmus Bertelsen, a Professor at the Arctic University of Norway, Marco Dordoni, a Visiting Researcher at NATO’s STO CMRE and PhD Candidate at Università per Stranieri di Perugia, Dr. George Nikolakakos, a Climate Scientist at NATO’s STO CMRE, and Dr. Pierre-Marie Poulain, a Senior Scientist at NATO’s STO CMRE.

No. 7/2024, 24th July 2024

This article is a part of the Arctic Circle Journal Series which provides insight, understanding and new information. The material represents the opinions of the author but not those of Arctic Circle.