Rethinking Arctic Peace and Stability: Moving from Speculation to Reaffirming Commitments

Since February 2022, there have been interpretations and speculations of an increase of militarization and emerging confrontation in the Arctic. Yet, there are no armed conflicts or warfare in the region, unlike the hot wars and constant warfare in the Middle East, Africa, Southern Asia and Europe. Instead, the Arctic Region seems to be in a state of constant (peaceful) transformation that affects the region and the entire Earth mostly by more constructive ways, despite the deployed heavy nuclear weapon systems of the Russian Federation and the United States.

The first significant transformation of the Arctic led from the military tensions of the Cold War to geopolitical stability based on cooperation across borders. This would not have been possible without the growing concern among Indigenous Peoples, non-governmental organisations, civil society, and scholars and scientists over the state of the region’s ecosystems. This concern led to the establishment of cooperative structures on environmental protection among the Arctic States and Indigenous Peoples, in particular the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy and the Arctic Council. This also caused a shift in their security premises towards a more comprehensive understanding of security.

Experience has shown that functional cooperation in the field(s) of low politics is an efficient way of rebuilding confidence between former rivals. In terms of the circumpolar North, the most vivid example is cooperation on environmental protection due to long-range air and water pollution, which became a shared interest and stabilising factor in the region’s geopolitics and security. As a result, the eight Arctic States, supported by Indigenous Peoples Organisations and local communities, reconstructed their geopolitical reality committing “to maintain peace, stability and constructive cooperation”, as stated by Arctic Council declarations.

When analysing the transformation and reconstruction that has taken place in the northernmost regions within the last 35 years or so, the main conclusion is twofold: Firstly, trans-boundary cooperation indicates the presence of shared/common interests among the Arctic States, and between them and Arctic Indigenous Peoples, for example on environmental protection, search and rescue, scientific cooperation, and economic activities. Secondly, certain specific features of Arctic geopolitics, security and governance—for example, the original nature of Arctic military for global deterrence, the lack of armed conflicts and serious disputes of state sovereignty, the high degree of international legal certainty, and self-governance—made it uniquely possible to form suitable conditions for resilient cooperation. This enabled an increase in geopolitical stability and supported regional development.

Recognised as a distinctive, cooperative region, the Arctic became globalised by major environmental challenges, in particular rapid climate change and global economic interests such as the mass-scale utilisation of hydrocarbons. After Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, the Arctic started to reflect the patterns of great-power rivalries and new East-West tension, as the temporary pause of the Arctic Council and its working groups indicates.

My latest research, published as the Geneva Paper 35/2024, shows that most of the common interests and special features of Arctic geopolitics are still in place or can easily be revived, given the necessary political will. A sustainable solution to the climate crisis—worldwide and in the Arctic—is based on interdependence. The common interests in the Arctic reveal such an interdependent nature of the region, made possible by its special geopolitical features. Cross-border cooperation in the Arctic is a practical and doable means, as has been shown, even manifested, in the first decades of the post-Cold War Arctic.

Ultimately, while seven (NATO-aligned) Arctic States might share the thinking that Russia is no longer a reliable partner, they nevertheless still share with Russia the undeniable knowledge that the benefits of cooperation and stability are much greater than those of conflict and confrontation with high prices. Yet, despite all the speculations and threat pictures, the entire North is still free of armed conflicts, warfare and uprisings, unlike many other parts of the world. It has also been possible to maintain joint activities of Arctic Council Working Groups. Furthermore, there is a great deal more to gain for all parties, in particular for the peoples and communities of the region, if we were to go back to a situation where cooperation is a key part of the Arctic States’ foreign, security and climate policies.

The conclusions of the Geneva paper reveal that there are no real obstacles to the Arctic States rediscovering the huge benefits of cooperation—except a potentially catastrophic lack of the necessary political will to do so. To avoid or minimise this danger, more research and analysis needs to be done on the dynamics and benefits of shared interests, as well as on cooperation as the main factor of international relations. We need to move away from focusing research purely on the description of challenges and speculation about potential threats. Finally, it would be logical and sensible, at this stage, to recognize the shared interests and special features as constructive aspects and ingredients of Arctic geopolitics and governance. We need to analyse the processes, as well as rethink, discuss and debate how to reaffirm commitments to maintain peace and stability.

For more detailed information see, L. Heininen, ”Geopolitical Features, Common Interests and the Climate Crisis: The Case of the Arctic.” Geneva Paper 35/24. Geneva Center for Security Policy. May 2024.

No. 8/2024, 29th August 2024

This article is a part of the Arctic Circle Journal Series which provides insight, understanding and new information. The material represents the opinions of the author but not those of Arctic Circle.