Predicting the Future Arctic: Views from an Arctic Expert Survey

The future of the Arctic region is dependent on several structural forces, the most important being climate change, but geopolitical dynamics are increasingly coming to the fore and institutional cooperation is currently hampered. The future of the region is also highly contested and subject to much speculation, some predicting a race, a struggle or both simultaneously while others predict a more orderly and stable development. As a result, we decided to organise a survey asking Arctic experts their predictions about the likelihood of possible Arctic geopolitical developments. This method has considerable advantages. First, we sought to capture regional expertise, collective wisdom and consensus rather than relying on isolated assessments of experts reading the region’s oracle. Secondly, we were able to capture the developments that experts see as most likely rather than gathering normative assessments of whether a described development was desirable or not. Hence, the objective is to assess where the areas of consensus emerged and which perceptions were dominant on key governance and security questions. Moreover, we want to build a time-series on important issues to track possible changes in the perception on, inter alia, Arctic security and governance.

We conducted the first wave of this expert survey in June 2022 reaching 69 respondents and a second wave in January 2023 gathering 60 responses. We adopted a broad definition of Arctic experts, one encompassing academics, governmental officials, civil society representatives. We asked experts to rate from 0 (impossible to happen) to 100 (certain to happen) the likelihood that certain Arctic developments might occur. Some observations emerged out of these two waves.

The responses to the Arctic Barometer polls allow a number of conclusions to be drawn with regard to selected issues of Arctic Governance, i.e., with regard to the future of international cooperation in the Arctic and with regard to the potential independence of Greenland from Denmark.

International Cooperation in the Arctic

After the escalation of Russia’s war against Ukraine since 24 February 2022, the seven Western Arctic like-minded states (A7) paused all cooperation with the Russian Federation in the Arctic Council (AC) on 3 March 2022. Since June 2022, the A7 have begun to cooperate on selected issues again, limited to projects that had been approved by the AC before Russia had taken over the chair of the AC in 2021. In May 2023, Norway took over from Russia and it seems possible that the A7 will continue to use the AC as much as possible once Norway will assume the chair of the most important forum for international cooperation in the Arctic. It has to be noted, however, that Russia could block AC activities and that there is not a mechanism in place that would allow the AC or the other member states to exclude Russia from the AC.

Although it has increased slightly in 2023 compared to 2022, the likelihood of a renewal of full cooperation among all eight member states of the AC within a matter of a few months to half a year continues to be considered very low. The mood overall remained pessimistic even after the partial resumption of some activities and the change of chairship.

Figure 1: expert predictions for the first wave (June 2022) to the statement “All eight Arctic countries will resume cooperation at the Arctic Council before September 30 2022”.

Figure 2: expert predictions for the second wave (January 2023) to the statement “All eight Arctic countries will resume cooperation at the Arctic Council before September 30 2023”.

This assessment is realistic as there has been no change in the overall situation that would allow for a changed stance on the part of the A7. This does not mean, however, that respondents imagined a rapid creation of a Western substitute forum that would replace the Arctic Council. Respondents assessed that such possibility was not likely to happen in a few months. They considered it somewhat more likely that cooperation in the Arctic Coast Guard Council would be resumed in the short term, although this, too, was assessed as very unlikely.

Figure 3: expert predictions for the second wave (January 2023) to the statement “Seven Arctic states (except Russia) will start a new regional Arctic forum before September 30 2023”.

Figure 4: expert predictions for the second wave (January 2023) to the statement “Cooperation among all eight Arctic states on the Arctic Coast Guard Forum will resume before September 30 2023”.

The impact of Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine and the numerous crimes that continue to be committed against the civilian population of Ukraine on the international governance of the Arctic is therefore generally thought to not be merely a short-term issue. Only time will tell if the assessment regarding cooperation within the next half of a decade will be correct. At the moment, it seems to be reasonable to assume that cooperation with the current government in Moscow has become impossible.

Under the constitutional construction applicable to Greenland’s self-rule government, Greenland has the option to eventually become independent from Denmark. For different political and especially economic reasons, this option has not yet been used by the government in Nuuk. A draft Constitution was published in Nuuk in April 2023, but no timeline was conveyed, and although surveys indicate a vast majority for independence, the timing and model (e.g. Free Association) are often times rather abstractly discussed. The Arctic Barometer poll has asked respondents to assess the likelihood of independence at different dates in the future: before 2025 and 2030.

Figure 5: expert predictions on the statement “Greenland will become a sovereign nation before January 1 2025”.

Figure 6: expert predictions on the statement “Greenland will become a sovereign nation before January 1 2030”.

The responses to the Arctic Barometer speak a clear language: the farther in the future the date of potential independence is, the greater the likelihood of independence was perceived. This aligns with the debates inside Greenland and with the political and economic reality there. While independence in the very near future seems very unlikely, the likelihood was seen as significantly higher regarding later dates, i.e., 2030. However, the media response was at 40: a majority of respondents judged as unlikely this development before 2030.

If the assessment is pessimistic on the governance front, experts still believe that there is little chance that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will spill over into an Arctic military conflict. Predictions both in June 2022 and January 2023 point towards a low likelihood of military conflict.

Figure 7: expert predictions for the first wave (June 2022) to the statement “A military conflict will take place in the Arctic region before January 1 2026”.

Figure 8: expert predictions for the second wave (January 2023) to the statement “A military conflict will take place in the Arctic region before January 1 2026”.

However, the likelihood of aggressive or confrontational initiatives is not completely discarded. A military conflict would be the culmination of a West-Russia confrontation in the Arctic: other outcomes are possible short of military conflict. For example, a Russian military exercise in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of an Arctic state before September 30 2023 is deemed more likely to occur. Similarly, a freedom of navigation operation (FONOP) is assessed as the most likely development to occur in the Arctic region, with a median of 50 out of 100.

Figure 9: expert predictions for the second wave (January 2023) to the statement “Russia will conduct a military exercise in the EEZ of Arctic states before September 30 2023”.

Figure 10: expert predictions for the second wave (January 2023) to the statement “The U.S. will conduct a freedom of navigation operation in the Arctic region before January 1 2026”.

Lastly, we have asked the expert panel if NATO will specifically address challenges in the Arctic region in its next strategic concept document. For some years pundits have speculated if, or when, NATO will draft a more coherent Arctic strategy or initiate a more formal role in the region. This has not yet happened, but for the first time, NATO’s 2022 strategic concept did mention the ‘High North’, and how Russia’s capability to disrupt reinforcements and freedom of navigation across the North Atlantic was a strategic challenge among the allied. A vast majority in our experts' survey deem it likely that the Arctic will feature in the alliance-stated priorities. Even though NATO’s strategic concept is only updated approximately once every decade, this shows that NATO is expected to up the ante in the Arctic in the future.

Figure 11: predictions for the second wave (January 2023) to the statement “NATO will specifically address Arctic challenges in its next strategic concept document”.

Much turbulence can be observed in Arctic governance and security. New ideas and initiatives are proposed by governments and scholars alike to offer solutions to these problems. Looking at experts’ predictions, we find surprising stability in such uncertain times: the past year has not changed the generally held consensus that military conflict is unlikely in the Arctic region while multilateral cooperation will not fully resume.

Alternative arrangements to the current governance infrastructure do not appear likely either. The change in chairship to Norway could provide impetus to revise this assessment, especially if scientific cooperation can partially resume at the Arctic Council. However, we need to point out that the responses were received before Russia had published its updated Arctic policy document in spring 2023. This updated policy replaced the 2020 policy with immediate effect and confirms the course that Moscow has embarked on. Unlike in the past, the new policy document no longer makes reference to international cooperation in the Arctic Council (likewise, the Barents Euro Arctic Council is no longer featured). It remains to be seen how functional the Arctic Council will be without Russia or if some form of A8-cooperation will resume in the future; e.g. in the working groups of the Arctic Council or the Arctic Coast Guard Forum, etc. Lingering dysfunctionality in key institutions could bring Arctic states to revise their assumptions about Arctic governance and security arrangements.

No. 1/2023, 31 May 2023

This article is a part of the Arctic Circle Journal Series which provides insight, understanding and new information. The material represents the opinions of the authors but not those of Arctic Circle.